The same points can be made as readily by the example of diseases that once produced high rates of psychiatric morbidity and premature mortality. Pellagra and general paresis, now uncommon enough to challenge diagnostic acumen, were major problems in psychiatric practice in the first third of this century. The one was virtually eliminated by social progress resulting in improved diet; the other by a public health measurevenereal disease control. Some may demur at claiming these victories in the name of preventive psychiatry; the key interventions had little to do with psychiatry as such. However, what matters for the health of the public is disease prevention, not specialty hegemony. The control of automobile emissions which has reduced blood lead levels in US children (Centers for Disease Control 1982b) is part of prevention in paediatrics even though the key actors are environmental toxicologists and engineers rather than paediatricians.
These few instances from a large array illustrate the extent to which disease prevention is part of contemporary reality. Yet prevention has emerged as a major theme in the political rhetoric of health policy only within the past decade and continues to be hotly debated. Why?
Some of the debate is over scientific matters: how strong is the evidence that the programmes proposed will prevent the diseases targeted for control, and that the side effects of the interventions are substantially less than the disease sequelae? The larger source of disagreements about policy stems from disputes about values rather than about scientific evidence: on what scale should the expected costs be weighed against the putative benefits? What resources is society willing to expend toward these ends? What degree of dislocation in its institutions and its customary way of life is the community willing to tolerate in order to prevent disease? Questions of 'fact' (i.e. does it work?) are not always readily distinguishable from questions of 'value' (i.e. should it be done?).. Nonetheless, it will be useful to examine the value context in which health policy is decided before reviewing the empirical evidence in support of present and future initiatives in preventive psychiatry.
Cost savings as the bottom line Today, policy statements by health ministries enthusiastically embrace the rhetoric of prevention. The reason is not far to seek: the relentless growth of medical care costs. For the 'Lecture delivered by Professor Eisenberg, Royal Society of Medicine Foundation/Burroughs Wellcome Visiting Professor, to the Sections of Psychiatry and Paediatrics, 1 July 1983. Accepted 7 July 1983 United States in 1981 health expenditures were estimated at $287 billion (Gibson & Waldo 1982) , an amount equal to 9.8% of the gross national product, a dramatic increase from the 8.9% share just two years earlier and a doubling of the percentage of GNP expended in 1958. In its 'Forward Plan for Health', which heralded its new emphasis on prevention, the US Department of Health, Education and Welfare (1976) stated: 'The primary focus of our program is a major attack on cost escalation as the factor now driving national health policy'. Similar goals have been voiced by Canada (Lalonde 1974) , by the United Kingdom (Department of Health and Social Security 1976) , and by the OECD (1977) . The goal of controlling health care costs is surely unexceptionable. But will prevention control costs? More to the point, is cost-saving the most appropriate standard for evaluating the benefits of preventive medicine?
A single example, the success of vaccination against poliomyelitis, seems to compel an affirmative answer. The total costs of the basic and applied research, which led to the vaccine, and of the field trials, which established its utility, came to less than the treatment costs incurred in a single epidemic year in the pre-vaccine era (Fudenberg 1973) . Similarly, cost-benefit analyses for pertussis, measles and rubella vaccines demonstrate a sizeable decrease in net medical care costs from their use (Willems & Sanders 1981) . However, the calculus is different for influenza virus and polyvalent pneumococcal (pneumovax) vaccines. Despite the fact that each reliably prevents disease, their population-wide use would increase net medical costs rather than lower them, because of differences in efficiency, in disease incidence, in population susceptibility, in duration of protection and in side effects as compared to the first four vaccines. Community use of pneumovax for persons aged 45 to 64 years would cost about $5700 per year of healthy life gained; if vaccination were to be restricted to persons aged 65 years and older, the cost would decrease to $1000 per year of healthy life gained. For influenza, vaccinating one million elderly persons aged 65 and over would avert more than 500 deaths at a net cost of $491 per year of life gained.
Health benefits are not the same as cost savings. Governments face different decisions about employing the first four vaccines than with the latter two. Is $500 per year of life saved, $1000, or $5700 a reasonable expenditure?
Cost-benefit analysis Given such findings, should we not reconsider cost-benefit analysis as the primary mode for assessing preventive interventions? In essence, net benefit is calculated by adding (a) the savings in averted medical care expenses and (b) the increased productivity of workers (years of life gained and days of illness avoided multiplied by income), and then subtracting from that total (c) the cost of the preventive programme (Kristein 1977 , Scheffler & Paringer 1980 . These calculations follow a 'human capital' approach which values a life by its earnings in the market. By its nature this approach underprices those who are too young or too old to be in the workforce, housewives whose work output does not lead to income, and women and minority workers who are systematically underpaid. Moreover, it does not take into account pain and suffering for patient and family, nor the value of human life in itself. Methods have been proposed for estimating proxy dollar values for these components (Landefeld & Seskin 1982) but they remain problematic (Rice & Hodgson 1982) . If they were to be employed, there might well be a different 'bottom line' to the analyses for flu vaccine and pneumovax. Let us assume a net benefit had been demonstrated by this calculus. However persuasive it might seem to the individuals at risk for morbidity and mortality from influenza and pneumonia, it would still necessitate increased health expenditures, the very item government seeks to reduce. There are fundamental problems for social justice in the asymmetry between those who pay and those who benefit, and in the scales on which costs and benefits are assessed.
Macroeconomics of disease prevention
There is an even more formidable obstacle to disease prevention being effective in controlling rising medical care costs. Although we speak of preventing death, what we do when we are effective is to postpone it. As Gori & Richter (1978) point out, prevention of premature death will increase the number of individuals in the population who survive to 65 and beyond, the very period in which the infirmities of age increase the costs of care. Those aged 65 and older constituted 1.1% of the US population in 1980 but consumed almost 30% of total health care costs; demographic projections for the year 2020, based on present longevity, indicate that they will constitute 17.2% of the population and will consume 40% of total health care costs (Rice & Feldman 1982) . Those aged 75 and older will make up 6.5% of the British and American populations and 7.6% of the Swedish by the year 2000. Thus, increases in health care costs are inevitable, not only despite effective prevention but to some extent because of it, unless we dream of unlikely research 'breakthroughs' in the prevention of the chronic diseases which accumulate with age.
None of these considerations, in my view, weakens the case for prevention if we weigh it on the scale of humane values; they do make abundantly evident the danger of trying to justify prevention on purely economic grounds. Mental health programmes are a particular hazard in this regard. In the United States, 'deinstitutionalization' was widely heralded as a cost-saving measure. Available data indicate that costs have been shifted between sectors, not saved (Goldman et al. 1983 ). The rhetoric of cost control impeded obtaining funds for the quality care in the community on which the hope for change had been based (Borus 1981) .
Choice of target
Decisions to allocate additional resources to, or redistribute resources within, the health sector are but one aspect of cost accounting in social policy. Since the introduction of quarantine to control plague in the Middle Ages, it has been evident that public health measures affect the general economy. Furthermore, the costs and the benefits are differentially distributed within the population. Thus, despite the overwhelming evidence of the increase in cancer resulting from cigarette smoking, the United States has not moved beyond warning the public of its dangers while continuing to subsidize tobacco growers. Indeed, the peremptory discharge of Joseph Califano, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare in the Carter cabinet resulted in part from his 'excessive zeal' in pursuing an antismoking campaign. The problem is not limited to capitalist states: the People's Republic of China, for example, produces more tobacco tonnage than the United States through a highly profitable state monopoly.
It is estimated that there may be 100 000 deaths, 400 000 new illnesses and 20 million injuries related to work each year in the United States (Levy & Wegman 1983) . But intervention to reduce that toll threatens industrial profits and employment. In the current conservative political climate, governments find it convenient to highlight uncertainties in scientific knowledge about occupational diseases in order to downplay regulation and to hold workers responsible for accident-proneness, failure to use safety equipment properly, and contributing to pulmonary hazards by smoking , Derickson 1983 . The mounting evidence that behaviour influences health (Hamburg et al. 1982) has been used to justify a shift in public health policy to a disproportionate focus on individual behaviour. The provision of health information on health injurious behaviour is an appropriate role for government. But exhortation for individual change should not be a substitute for the use of the taxing and regulatory power of government to reduce risk factors in the environment (Ontario Council of Health 1982). Disease prevention can be understood only in a political as well as a medical context.
Medical knowledge provides a technological base for the analysis of policy options.
However, it is the political process, reflecting the power and the values of the several constituencies in society, that will determine which choices are made (Eisenberg 1977a ).
Preventing psychiatric morbidity
Against this sketch of the context in which policy decisions will be taken, let us now consider what we know about preventing psychiatric disorders in children. For ease of discussion, I will first survey means for protecting the brain against injury and then turn to interventions designed to enhance psychosocial development. The dichotomy is entirely arbitrary; in life, interaction is the rule rather than the exception (Eisenberg 1977b ). Brain damage, as Michael Rutter (1981) has demonstrated, not only increases the risk for psychopathology and subnormality, but also renders the individual more vulnerable to environmental adversities. Conversely, relatively moderate insults to the brain, which have no detectable aftermath in a favourable environment, add to the dysfunctions exhibited by children who grow -up in a stressful one (Werner & Smith 1977) .
Prenatal care
Weight at birth reflects the adequacy of intrauterine development. Low birth weight (LBW) is associated with higher rates of neonatal mortality and of neuropsychiatric morbidity among survivors. The single most powerful predictor of the probability of LBW is the socioeconomic class of the mother (Rosen 1982) . This reflects the combined effects of inadequate maternal nutrition, delay in obtaining obstetric care, poor health habits and increased life stress. Nonetheless, despite the persistence of other unfavourable environmental features, the provision of proper obstetric care (Goldman & Grossman 1982 ) and supplemental nutrition during pregnancy (Kennedy et al. 1982) has been shown to reduce the proportion of LBW infants born to mothers at risk.
Smoking during pregnancy increases the rate of prematurity, with its attendant risks (Surgeon General 1980). Although physician-initiated efforts to discourage smoking in the general population have met with limited success, they may be more successful when targeted at pregnant women (King & Eiser 1981) .
Excess alcohol intake in pregnancy can result in the fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS), manifested by growth retardation, craniofacial and cardiac anomalies and abnormalities in the central nervous system (Streissguth et al. 1980 ). In addition, alcohol abuse is associated with fetal wastage, low birth weight and congenital anomalies short of the full syndrome (Sokol et al. 1980 ). The combination of smoking and alcohol abuse doubles the risk. In laboratory research, the administration of alcohol to pregnant mice (Sulik et al. 1981 ) and monkeys (Mukherjee & Hogden 1981) early in pregnancy has been shown to produce placental and fetal abnormalities. Whether the goal of total abstinence during pregnancy is prudent health policy remains a matter of dispute (Lancet 1983), but the public has a right as well as a need to know the hazards to pregnancy associated with drinking. That such knowledge may alter behaviour in the community is suggested by recent data from Seattle. Between 1974 and 1981, an interval during which there was a large public health campaign to prevent the fetal alcohol syndrome, the number of women reporting any alcohol use at the time of the first prenatal visit dropped from 81% to 42% (Streissguth et al. 1983 ). There was, however, no significant change in the number of heavy drinkers and binge drinkers in the first trimester, the group at greatest risk.
Maternal rubella during the first trimester of pregnancy places the fetus at severe risk for the congenital rubella syndrome, the stigmata of which include severe mental retardation and autism. Once the mother has been infected, therapeutic abortion is the only option. Immunization is not recommended once pregnancy is suspected, although there have been no cases of the congenital rubella syndrome among the more than 400 infants born to women to whom the vaccine had been given inadvertently (Centers for Disease Control 1982c). Two policy options have been proposed for the prevention of congenital rubella. The first, adopted in the United Kingdom, targets vaccination at girls aged 11-14 years and nonimmune women of child-bearing age. Despite substantial levels of immunity in young women (Clarke et al. 1983 ), a 1978-79 outbreak of rubella led to an increase in cases of congenital rubella and in induced abortions among infected women. The second option, adopted in the United States, aims to vaccinate all children in order to produce herd immunity. Implementation of this programme has been followed by a sharp drop in the incidence of childhood rubella and a change in the age distribution of cases. It was not until 1980, however, that a decisive reduction in the incidence of rubella in 15-19 year olds became evident as the cohort vaccinated 10 years earlier reached late adolescence. As a result, there are current indications of a decline in congenital rubella (Hinman 1982) .
Amniocentesis between the 15th and 16th week of pregnancy permits the intrauterine diagnosis of a number of major disorders of the central nervous system. About one-third of cases of severe mental subnormality result from trisomy 21, the risk for which is about 1 in 900 for all births but rises to about 1 in 200 among mothers aged 35-39 and 1 in 50 among mothers aged 40 and older. Routine amniocentesis followed by abortion among mothers aged 35 and older could prevent 20% of cases of Down's syndrome in the United States (Holmes 1978) .
The United Kingdom has pioneered the development of programmes to prevent neural tube defects (anencephaly and spina bifida). Screening of pregnant women for serum alphafetoprotein (AFP), followed by amniocentesis for AFP and acetylcholinesterase and sonography among those with levels more than two times the median AFP value for the population, permits identification of the affected fetus. Selective abortion prevents the multiple severe handicaps (paralysis, incontinence and mental subnormality) found in the majority of infants with neural tube defects and removes a source of great distress for families (Laurence 1974) , evident in a high divorce rate (Tew et al. 1977) . Preliminary data suggest, but do not prove, that the administration of folic acid, ascorbic acid and riboflavin during pregnancy may protect against neural tube defects (Laurence 1982) . However, for reasons not understood, the frequency of neural tube defects at birth has recently declined in both the UK (Owens et al. 1981 ) and the US (Windham & Edmonds 1982) .
Other much rarer inherited disorders of metabolism can be detected prenatally, but their rarity makes them unsuitable for public health programmes. There is one major new possibility. The fragile X syndrome has been shown to be the second most common of the syndromes associated with mental subnormality (Turner et al. 1980 , Gerald 1980 . Although prenatal tests do yield false negatives, positives are highly reliable. When prior cases have been recognized in families, it is now possible to consider amniocentesis for subsequent pregnancies.
Neonatal screening
Screening tests for phenylketonuria (PKU) and congenital hypothyroidism permit their detection in time to institute early treatment programmes (secondary prevention) which markedly reduce the likelihood of mental subnormality (Scriver 1980 , Dussault 1978 .
Prenatal and neonatal screening have costs that must be assessed. Not only is the yield from tests for uncommon conditions relatively small, but the number of false positives will be -disproportionately large. At the least, a false positive creates unwarranted anxiety; at the worst, treatment, which has its own risks, will have been wrongly instituted. Thus, laboratory procedures for screening must be associated with a sophisticated diagnostic assessment of each case to make possible a firm biochemical diagnosis. The obverse danger is a false negative: failure to identify a case because of the insensitivity of the test, laboratory failure, or the use of the test at a suboptimal time in the infant's life. It makes little sense to institute screening without an array of follow-up services, diagnostic facilities, and treatment programmes (Holtzman 1983) . Despite excellent technical performance, a screening programme can fall far short of its goal because of lack of funds and facilities, public education, case retrieval, continuing medical care, and counselling (Grover et al. 1978) .
Infants with a positive phenylalanine screening test must be evaluated promptly to distinguish PKU from benign hyperphenylalaninaemia (which needs no treatment) and from deficiency in dihydropteridine reductase or deficiency in dihydrobiopterin synthetase, which must be treated by tetrahydrobiopterin and neurotransmitter precursors (Scriver 1980) rather than by a phenylalanine low diet. Success in treating children with PKU has given rise to a second order problem: a hazard to infants born to successfully treated women. Maternal hyperphenylalaninaemia during pregnancy leads to microcephaly and cardiac malformations. In principle, it should prove possible to reduce risk by putting women with this disorder on a phenylalanine low diet before they attempt to become pregnant. If the diet is introduced after pregnancy occurs, it brings little benefit because of damage done during the first six weeks of fetal development (Lenke & Levy 1980) . Preventing environmental hazards to the brain Accidents and poisonings are the leading causes of childhood and adolescent mortality and morbidity in the United States. Brain damage from head trauma can be minimized by vehicle accident control measures, including speed limits; car safety restraints; automatically released air bags; better highway design; crash helmets for skateboard, bicycle and motorcycle users; and appropriate traffic regulation. What is striking is how little we have done despite the fact that accidents accounted for more than 26% of the years of potential life lost in the US in 1981 (Centers for Disease Control 1983).
Childhood poisonings have been markedly reduced in the US since the introduction of safety caps on medication bottles and on common household disinfectants and other hazardous chemicals (Walton 1982) . Morbidity and mortality from fires have been reduced by the installation of smoke detectors to provide early warning.
Blood lead levels which result in relatively minor symptoms in adults can produce serious toxicity in children. In an epidemiological study of children with elevated lead levels in deciduous teeth, they were shown to perform less well on tests of intelligence and to exhibit more learning and behaviour problems (Needleman et al. 1979 , Bellinger & Needleman 1983 ) than classroom controls with low lead levels. The introduction of environmental protection standards has resulted in a decrease in blood lead levels among American children (Centers for Disease Control 1982b).
Immunization in childhood
Active immunization against diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus, poliomyelitis, measles, mumps and rubella has such extraordinary success in minimizing the neuropsychiatric sequelae of these diseases that one might expect it to be universal. For example, not only has the incidence of measles declined so sharply in the United States that imported cases are now the major hazard, but so has the incidence of subacute sclerosing panencephalitis, a slow virus infection of the CNS which follows measles and leads to mental deterioration and death (Hopkins et al. 1982 ). Yet public controversy in the UK about pertussis vaccine reactions resulted in a sharp drop in immunization levels from about 77% in 1974 to 30% in 1978. In consequence, large outbreaks of pertussis occurred during 1978-79 and 1981-82 (Centers for Disease Control 1982d). A recent survey of disorders attributed to vaccination in the Northwest Thames region (Pollack & Morris 1983) found no convincing evidence that diphtheria/tetanus/pertussis vaccine caused major neurological damage, despite claims to the contrary (Stewart 1977) . It is surely intolerable, in view of the enormous ratio of benefit to cost from childhood vaccinations, that we fall short of complete population coverage. Those of us in developed countries ought also to be willing to invest resources and manpower in vaccination programmes in the Third World, where the mortality and morbidity rates from these infections are much higher than they are in the West (Hopkins et al. 1982) .
Promoting psychosocial development
Vaccination has become the paradigm for prevention, an inexpensive measure which need be applied only once or at most a few times in order to yield permanent immunity. The most spectacular instance of success was the WHO smallpox immunization campaign (Breman & Arita 1980) : it worked so well that no further expenditures for disease control are required (other than for virus maintenance in designated international laboratories to make assurance doubly sure).
How far does this model apply to the prevention of psychosocial disorders? Unfortunately for those who harbour fantasies of a quick technical fix, it is completely inappropriate. There is not now, nor will there be, a short-term psychiatric intervention which confers permanent or even long-lived immunity to later challenge. Why should this be so?
Development is an epigenetic process. Successful negotiation of one stage of development makes successful passage through the next more likely, but does not assure it. The organism faces new adaptive challenges at each new level of behavioural organization and requires additional inputs. Consider so straightforward a biological process as growth. Food is as specific a preventive for malnutrition as vaccination is for smallpox. Nonetheless, seeing to it that a child is well fed in the first year of life confers no protection against malnutrition at age five. The effects of undernutrition are different at different ages but there is no age at which food is not necessary. In like fashion, the psychosocial needs of infant, child and adolescent differ during development, but those needs must be met throughout the life span (Eisenberg 1977b ).
Yet the search for the psychiatric equivalent of vaccination continues. Its most recent embodiment is the concept of mother-infant 'bonding', a term which suggests a permanent epoxy junction. Klaus & Kennel (1976) contend that 'there is a sensitive period in the first minutes or hours of life during which it is necessary that the mother and the father have close contact with their neonate for later development to be optimal'. The claim that early contact is necessary has led others to the naive belief that early contact is sufficient to insure adequate parenting. Neither claim is warranted. Normal parent-child relationships are possible even for premature infants separated from their parents in the intensive care unit for the first several months of life. This is not to suggest that early contact may not be both desirable and pleasure-giving, but rather to emphasize that it is not a necessary condition for subsequent development.
As to its 'sufficiency', the most recent careful reviews of the literature provide no evidence for enduring effects from early contact (Lamb & Hwang 1982 , Herbert et al. 1982 . In a longitudinal study of childrearing, Egeland & Vaughn (1981) found no evidence that the amount of contact in the hours after birth distinguished between mothers who mistreated their children and those who provided quality child care. The emphasis on the critical importance of bonding has exacted a considerable price in the distress of mothers who feel they can never make up for a crucial experience missed because illness precluded early intimacy. And there is a further cost: each unwarranted claim adds to the widespread scepticism which greets proposals for psychosocial intervention, even when well founded.
With these considerations in mind, I shall now review the evidence for the effectiveness of some of the psychosocial measures proposed for the reduction of psychiatric morbidity and mortality in childhood and adolescence: family planning; pre-school intervention programmes; short-term psychotherapy; and suicide prevention.
Family planning
Children and their mothers show increased rates of psychiatric and medical morbidity when mothers have too many children (Brown & Harris 1978) , when children are born to mothers who are too young (Hardy 1973 , Furstenberg 1976 , Taylor et al. 1983 , and when they are born unwanted (Forssman & Thuwe 1966 , Matejeck et al. 1978 . Currently available methods of contraception and abortion have sharply reduced this burden. The reproductive mortality rate in the US has fallen by 73% over the past 20 years (Sachs et al. 1982) . Moreover, the increase in legal abortions since 1967 has been the single most important factor in the reduction of neonatal mortality (Grossman & Jacobowitz 1981) . Although firsttrimester abortion has less than one-tenth the mortality associated with continuation of pregnancy among teenagers (Ory 1983) ; although it does not impair the outcome of subsequent pregnancy (Daling & Emanuel 1977 , Hogue et al. 1982 ; and although it results in improved psychosocial adjustment among women with unwanted pregnancies (Greer et al. 1976) , it must be regarded as an unsatisfactory substitute for the use of contraception. However, abortion will remain an essential back-up for contraceptive failure.
Despite the substantial contribution contraception has made to maternal and child health, its use among the group at greatest risk for untoward outcomessexually-active teenagerscontinues to be inconsistent and unreliable (Zelnik & Kantner 1980) . The extent of under-utilization is reflected in the high proportion of abortions to live births (0.72: 1.0) among women aged under 20 years (Cates 1980) . Further advances in contraceptive methods, though desirable in themselves, cannot be expected to resolve what is fundamentally a behavioural, not a technical, problem. The development of effective methods to educate adolescents for responsible sexuality must be acknowledged as a major challenge for preventive psychiatry. There are few grounds for satisfaction with present efforts.
Pre-school intervention programmes
With depressing regularity, studies comparing children from families of low and high socioeconomic status document a cumulative disadvantage with increasing age on tests of academic achievement among the poor (Eisenberg & Earls 1975) . Family background, whether indexed by the educational level or income of the parents, has repeatedly been proved to be the single most potent variable in predicting children's scholastic outcome. In part, this results from the biological disadvantage associated with poverty, as is evident from higher rates of prematurity, a greater illness burden (Egbonu & Starfield 1982) , and a higher mortality (Mare 1982) . The larger part of the educational handicap stems from culturallydetermined patterns of parent-child interaction which shape cognitive style, motivation and personality attributes into configurations insufficiently adaptive to the demands of the school environment. Biological and psychosocial determinants interact, as Cravioto (1981) has shown: in Guatamalan villages in which nutrition is marginal for all families, the children destined for malnutrition and retarded development are those reared by passive and unresponsive mothers in homes which provide low levels of stimulation.
Developmental attrition is by all odds the major problem in child psychiatry. The unhappy history of school failure is embedded in a matrix of conduct disorders, uns-ftisfactory work patterns, and antisocial behaviour. The repetition of this sequence through cycles of disadvantage (Rutter & Madge 1976 ) burdens both the families and the communities in which they live. To what extent is it possible to intervene to minimize bad outcomes among families at risk?
In the mid-1960s, during Lyndon Johnson's 'War on. Poverty', national pre-school intervention programmes were launched in the US with high hope of interrupting this cycle. Premature optimism was succeeded by premature pessimism, both attitudes based on cognitive test findings on heterogeneous samples of children enrolled in pre-school programmes of variable quality and duration. The most recent findings from long-term studies of children enrolled in selected Headstart programmes indicate gains persisting for more than a decade after enrolmentnot in IQ scores, which show little change, but in the ability to meet school requirements. Almost half the children in the untreated group failed to maintain age-appropriate grade placement in contrast to only one-quarter of the experimental children, a highly significant difference (Darlington et al. 1980) . However welcome such news may be, it is surprising. I would not have bet on persisting benefit from so time-limited an intervention. Yet the findings are rather robust and cannot be accounted for by sample attrition or differences in initial ability or background. It is difficult to believe that pre-school classroom instruction accounts in itself for the improved school performance. It seems more likely that the involvement of families, a key feature of many Headstart programmes, gave parents a sense of authority and led to changes in attitude and motivation toward schooling which continued after the formal programme had ended. The early attempts to evaluate Headstart, which focussed exclusively on cognitive measures, failed to assess the extent to which it brought parents into alliance with community agencies. Indeed, it has been the grassroots support in the community which has kept Headstart alive despite repeated efforts by fiscal conservatives to eliminate its budget.
Nonetheless, scientific understanding of the basic processes of psychosocial development remains limited. If any area warrants a massive and sustained commitment to fundamental research, the ecology of child development is surely that area. Yet, what is to be done in the meantime, a meantime which is likely to be a long time?
Some argue that costly programmes of unproven benefit should be deferred at a time of budget constraints, an argument, it should be noted, which leaves present taxing and spending priorities unexamined (Eisenberg 1978) . I am not at all persuaded by the'argument for economy, given the gross disparities in life opportunities by social class (DHSS 1980) . Children are exquisitely sensitive to time. They cannot be put into suspended animation while we divert expenditures for other purposes. Developmental needs must be met or development is likely to falter. Providing the best care we know how to give is no guarantee of a trouble-free future. Nothing is. All we can contend is that better beginnings improve the odds for happier endings. Extending pre-school and family programmes is only the first step. We must build on the gains they make possible by improving the quality of schooling. As Michael Rutter and his colleagues (1979) have shown, schools make a significant difference to behavioural outcomes. Child psychiatrists must become advocates for a sequence of-programmes appropriate to developmental age from the prenatal period through adolescence.
Short-term psychotherapy
The interventions thus far considered constitute primary prevention; that is, measures to preclude the development of disease in susceptible popul'ations. Secondary prevention as a public health concept, refers to early diagnosis and prompt treatment in order-to shorten the duration and limit the sequelae of illness. What is the evidence for the efficacy 'of short-term psychotherapy with disturbed children? Rutter (1982) has recently reviewed this topic; accordingly, my comments will be brief.
Fifteen years ago, after surveying outcome data, I concluded that -'most studies have been unable to provide systematic evidence of benefit when the treated are contrasted with waiting list or designated controls', although I cautioned: 'Not-to have found a difference is not equivalent to having demonstrated that there is in fact no difference' (Eisenberg 1969) . Indeed, my colleagues and I had reported one investigation which demonstrated benefit from psychotherapy (Eisenberg et al. 1965) . Neurotic children were assigned randomly to one of two groups: one received evaluation followed by advice; the other evaluation followed by brief treatment (five problem-oriented psychotherapy sessions). At the end of eight weeks, on ratings by the therapists (who were, of course, not blind to treatment conditions) as well as on ratings by school teachers (who were), the children who received brief treatment showed significantly greater benefit. The improvement appeared to persist at 6 months and at 24 months, to the extent that information obtained from parents by phone can be considered reliable. We were, however, reluctant to make strong claims on the basis of relatively soft criteria.
Currently, there is more substantial evidence that brief treatment can be effective (Rutter 1982) . Consider the excellent study by Professor Kolvin and his colleagues (1981) in the Newcastle schools. Their design eliminated selection bias by using an epidemiological approach to the identification of children with emotional and behavioural problems. Cases were assigned at random to treatment or control groups; outcome.was assessed by multiple measures which were employed at the end of treatment and repeated 18 months and 36 months after intake. The findings indicated that both group therapy and behaviour modification programmes produced significantly greater improvement than that found among untreated children or those whose parents had received only counselling.
While the new data are encouraging, they obviously do not settle the matter. Therapist attributes influence outcome in ways we do not fully understand. Outcome measures are still relatively crude and sometimes inconsistent with one another. When treatments purporting to be as different as group therapy and behaviour modification yield equivalent results, we must question the connection between theory and practice and establish what it is that the treatments have in common. We still do not know how to match treatment and therapist to condition and to patient.
Yet the limits to present knowledge must not be allowed to obscure the findings from this and other studies that psychological treatment does benefit children with emotional and behavioural disorders. Viewed from this perspective, the undersupply of psychiatric services for children warrants correction. I do not contend, because I do not believe it to be true, that even the best of such programmes will reduce the prevalence of psychiatric disorder among such children when they become adults. The common assumption that adult mental disorders have their roots in childhood is no more than an assumption, and a dubious one at that, certainly for the psychoses. Furthermore, measurement by distant outcome places an impossible burden of proof on childhood interventions; they will have to be powerful indeed to demonstrate an unequivocal effect in the face of the uncontrollable vicissitudes of subsequent life experience. Judging by the future implies that care is not worth providing for children unless it has a long-run payoff. Do any of us really believe that? Suicide prevention Suicide is the third leading cause of death among males and the fourth among females aged 15-24 in the US (Eisenberg 1980) . Effective means of prevention are devoutly to be desired, but are they available?
It has been claimed that telephone hot-lines prevent suicide; the claim is not supported by present evidence (Barraclough et al. 1977) . Phillips (1974) found that extensive publicity about dramatic suicides appears to lead to increased rates during periods immediately following such events. Yet it is not clear how we should act on this information in societies which place high value on a free press. It does seem probable, in view of the high risk for suicide in depressed patients, that prompt treatment of depressive episodes plus lithium prophylaxis for recurrence will lower rates. However, an attempt to test this hypothesis on a population-wide basis would be formidable because of the size of the samples required (Eisenberg 1980) . Then, apart from sound clinical management of the depressed patient who comes for help, is there nothing more we can do?
A promising lead emerges from an apparent anomaly. Suicide attempts were on the rise in both the US and the UK between 1960 and 1971 (Weissman 1974 ) but rates of completed suicide over the same time interval declined in the UK (before they levelled off in the mid 1970s) while they continued to increase in the US (Brown 1979) . The UK decline can be accounted for by the decrease in deaths from gas poisoning following upon the sharp reduction in the carbon monoxide content of the domestic gas supply (Kreitman 1976). In contrast, not only did suicide from this source remain constant in the US, but there has been a steady increase in suicide by firearms among young males, the latter accounting for most of the additional deaths (Boyd 1983 ). However, there is evidence of a decline in suicides attributable to barbiturates over a time interval in which the number of barbiturate prescriptions written by physicians declined by half (Institute of Medicine 1979).
Given the fact that ropes, knives, high places, automobiles and other means of committing suicide are so ubiquitous, it may seem counter-intuitive to believe that restricting access to coal gas, drugs and guns would deter suicide. But this 'common sense' view overlooks the fact that many suicides are impulsive and depend on the availability of means immediately at hand; some who use one method are reluctant to use others, and methods vary in lethality. Thus, present evidence strongly suggests that legislative measures to reduce access to lethal means can be expected to lower the suicide rates.
Moreover, gun control legislation can be expected to diminish homicide rates among adolescent and young -adult males. The common argument that 'gun control will not stop criminals' may well be true; it is entirely irrelevant to the health benefit from restricting firearms for the rest of the population. The lethality of guns converts assaults among family members and acquaintances (which account for the majority of homicides) into murders instead of non-fatal attacks. Unfortunately, these lessons have still to be learned in the US, despite public concern about our quite extraordinary homicide rate (Eisenberg 1980) .
Conclusion
Separating rhetoric from reality in prevention is a complex task. In a sense, prevention is the victim of its own success. On the one hand we are the beneficiaries of enormous gains in public health, stemming from improved living standards and effective public health methods; life expectancy has almost doubled in this century. On the other hand we are suffering an increase in the prevalence of chronic disorders as the population has aged and life styles have changed because of new living conditions. The public health methods which have been so successful in mitigating one set of problems are likely to prove largely irrelevant to the new ones. The task is to sustain the impetus which made possible present gain without issuing promisory notes we will not be able to redeem.
To some it will seem churlish to challenge the aphorism that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, but it does appear that the cost-benefit ratio measured in dollars or pounds may not be quite so favourable. If preventive medicine is to be justified, that justification must lie in improvements in the quality of life rather than its mere extension or the search for putative economic savings.
Surely, public policy must be informed by sober assessment of the available scientific evidence. But we must also recognize that it will be the rare case when scientific evidence is unambiguous in controversial matters. Despite the incompleteness of the knowledge base, policy decisions must be taken in the here and now. Those decisions will inevitably reflect the different valuations placed on risks and benefits from the perspectives of the competing constituences. There is no such thing as being value free; what we should insist upon is making values explicit.
Let me conclude with the ringing words of an American pioneer in public health, Hermann M Biggs, who served as Commissioner of Health of New York State, and wrote the following in the Department's 'Monthly Bulletin' in 1911:
'Disease is largely a removable evil. It continues to afflict humanity, not only because of incomplete knowledge of its causes and lack of adequate individual and public hygiene, but also because it is extensively fostered by harsh economic and industrial conditions and by wretched housing in congested communities. These conditions and consequently the diseases which spring from them can be removed by better social organization. No duty of society, acting through its governmental agencies, is paramount to this obligation to attack the removable causes of disease ... The provision of more and better facilities for the protection of the public health must come in the last analysis through the education of public opinion so that the community shall vividly realize both its needs and its powers ... The reduction of the death rate is the principal statistical expression and index of human and social progress ... Public health is purchasable' (Winslow 1929) .
His grand vision is no less germane today, however much the particulars may have changed. The index of progress must now be morbidity rather than mortality, the methods will differ, but public education remains decisive if the community is to realize its needs and its powers. Let us join with Hermann Biggs in affirming that public health is purchasable!
